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Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
v. Wyoming: Appomattox Courthouse
Revisited
A highly divided Court again addressed the relatively new doctrine in
constitutional law: state exemption from federal regulations due to the
concept of federalism. Although the Court applied the tests from National
League of Cities v. Usery and its progeny, the Court reached a different re-
sult which, without expressly overruling that controversial case, severely
limited National League of Cities to its facts. The hope of modern states'
rights advocates proved to be short lived.
At the end of the Civil War in 1865, several southern states were
forced to surrender and abandon many of their notions of state
sovereignty. This War was not fought merely over the immediate
issue of slavery, but over the larger issue of states' rights. Even
after the bloody war, the nature of the relationship between the
United States and each individual state remains uncertain.' One
key to understanding the relationship lies in the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the tenth amendment.2 Opportunities to view
the issue are always unclear, clouded by emotional issues of slav-
ery, child labor, racial discrimination, and age discrimination.3
The recent United States Supreme Court decision in Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission v. Wyoming 4 attempts to clar-
ify the balance between Congressional power to regulate
commerce5 and the sovereignty of the states. 6
1. See Powell, The Compleat Jeffersonian: Justice Rehnquist and Federalism,
91 YALE L.J. 1317, 1320-21 (1982). Powell describes United States history as a
search for the balance between federal and state power. Id.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. X. The tenth amendment reads: 'The powers not dele-
gated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." Id.
3. See infra notes 16, 27, 30, 35 and accompanying text.
4. 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983).
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. The commerce clause reads in part: "Congress
shall have Power ... [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."
6. 103 S. Ct. at 1060. The state of Wyoming argued that the application of fed-
eral regulations is "precluded by virtue of external constraints imposed on Con-
gress' commerce powers by the Tenth Amendment." Id. This Note is intended to
explain the resolution the Court makes on the tension between federal power and
state sovereignty.
I. SCENARIO
In 1967, the United States established the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA).7 States were added to the defi-
nition of "employer" in 1974.8 Bill Crump, a fifty-five year old Dis-
trict Game Division supervisor for the Wyoming Game and Fish
Department, was involuntarily retired pursuant to Wyoming's law
enforcement retirement statute.9 Crump filed a complaint with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (Commis-
sion).1 0 The Commission filed suit against the state of Wyoming
and its officials in the District Court for the District of Wyoming,
alleging a violation of the ADEA." The Commission sought dam-
ages and declaratory and injunctive relief.12
The Commission proposed that Congress had constitutional
power to enact the ADEA under the commerce clause' 3 and the
fourteenth amendment. 4 In response to the Commission's com-
plaint, the state of Wyoming moved to dismiss for failure to state
7. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1976 & Supp.
IV 1980) [hereinafter referred to as ADEA]. Section 623(a) of the ADEA provides:
"It shall be unlawful for an employer- (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileg6s of employment, because of such in-
dividual's age .. " 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1976).
8. The ADEA did not originally apply to the federal, state, or local govern-
ments. In 1974, Congress extended the definition of "employer" to include state
and local governments, but not the federal government. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1976).
"The term 'employer' means ... a State or political subdivision of a State and any
agency or instrumentality of a State or a political subdivision of a State, and any
interstate agency, but such term does not include the United States, or a corpora-
tion wholly owned by the Government of the United States." Id.
9. 103 S. Ct. at 1059 n.7. Wyoming State Highway Patrol and Game and Fish
Warden Retirement Act, Wyo. STAT. § 31-3-107 (1977), provides for "[aIn employee
[to] continue in service on a year-to-year basis after age . . . fifty-five (55), with
the approval of the employer and under conditions as the employer may pre-
scribe." Id.
10. 103 S. Ct. at 1059. Thereafter, conciliation efforts were instituted between
the Commission and the Game and Fish Department which proved to be unsuc-
cessful. Id.
11. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Wyoming, 514 F. Supp. 595,
595-96 (D. Wyo. 1981). The suit was fied on behalf of Bill Crump and others simi-
larly situated. However, the Commission did not request a certification as a class
action. Id.
12. Id. at 596. The Commission wanted back pay and liquidated damages suf-
fered by Mr. Crump, as well as a reinstatement as a game warden. Id.
13. See supra note 5.
14. 514 F. Supp. at 597. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. "No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without the due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." Id. Enforcement of this amendment is provided in
section 5. Id. at § 5.
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a claim.15 The state first argued that Congress attempted to es-
tablish the ADEA pursuant to the commerce clause; however, the
attempt failed because the ADEA is in violation of the tenth
amendment.16 Second, the fourteenth amendment provides no
source of congressional power to establish the ADEA.17
The district court refused to allow the Commission to sue the
individual state officials, but upheld the suit against the state of
Wyoming.' 8 The court found that Congress was relying on its
commerce power to enact the ADEA.19 However, the court found
the application of the ADEA to the states to be unconstitutional,
violating the tenth amendment as construed by the Supreme
Court in National League of Cities v. Usery.20 The district court
seemed particularly concerned with the inconsistent application
of the ADEA to the states, but not to the federal government.
2 1
15. 514 F. Supp. at 596. Since the ADEA is unconstitutional, the state argued,
violation provides no grounds for relief. Id.
16. Id. The state relied on the 1976 Supreme Court decision in National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), which limits federal regulation of
states. See infra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
17. 514 F. Supp. at 596. The state argued that the ADEA "cannot apply here
where there is no impermissible violation of that amendment's equal protection
provisions." Id.
18. Id. The court did not allow the Commission to sue the governor of Wyo-
ming and the unpaid members of the State Game and Fish Commission as private
individuals. Id. See Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 908 (1974). The court in Smith held that immunity for public officials extends
to school board officials, rather than only to legislators and judges as originally ap-
plied at common law. Id. at 341-44. However, the district court's reliance on Smith
may be misplaced. The court in Smith said: "[iIt is important to stress that this is
purely a damage action, and this opinion is directed only to such a cause of ac-
tion." Id. at 340. The instant case involves equitable relief as well as damages.
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
19. 514 F. Supp. at 598-99. 29 U.S.C. § 621(a) (1976) provides that: "The Con-
gress hereby finds and declares that- . . (4) the existence in industries affecting
commerce, of arbitrary discrimination in employment because of age, burdens
commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce."
20. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). The district court used the balancing test, weighing
federal with state interests, from Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in Na-
tional League of Cities. Id. 514 F. Supp. at 600. The Court held: "Blackmun's con-
currence on the understanding that the National League majority was adopting a
'balancing approach' provides the key to a correct understanding of National
League, namely, that the Courts must use an ad hoc balancing test of weighing
the national interest and policy against the State activity sought to be displaced
by the federal regulation." Id.
21. 514 F. Supp. at 597, 600. The district court questioned: "How can there be a
supervening national interest when the Nation itself requires mandatory retire-
ment of its law enforcement personnel?" Id. at 600. See also Vance v. Bradley, 440
U.S. 93, 112 (1979) (mandatory retirement of Foreign Service personnel is valid);
Thomas v. United States Postal Inspection Serv., 647 F.2d 1035, 1037 (10th Cir. 1981)
The court specifically rejected the notion that the ADEA is an ex-
ercise of Congress under section five of the fourteenth amend-
ment.22 The Commission appealed to the Supreme Court on
direct appeal.23
II. HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT
The relationship between the federal government and the states
has been uncertain for a long time.24 During the nineteenth cen-
tury, the federal government and the states were considered co-
equal sovereigns, each entity supreme in its own realm. 25 The
Court in Hammer v. Dagenhart26 held that the commerce power
of Congress was limited by the tenth amendment, the text of dual
federalism. 27 At the same time, Congress was limited by the ex-
ternal constraints of the tenth amendment; the Court narrowly
construed the scope of the the commerce power. Manufacturing
was not considered "commerce." 28 Only activity which "directly"
(maximum ages for employing postal employees may be imposed by the Postal
Service). See also supra note 8.
22. 514 F. Supp. at 599. Section five authorizes Congress to provide for the en-
forcement of rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 5. See also Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), in
which the Court said: "Because such legislation imposes congressional policy on a
State involuntarily, and because it often intrudes on traditional state authority, we
should not quickly attribute to Congress an unstated intent to act under its au-
thority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 16.
23. 103 S. Ct. at 1057.
24. See Powell, supra note 1, at 1320. Powell says: 'The history of the United
States is in large part the story of the American struggle to define the relationship
between the states and the federal government." Id. He refers to John Marshall's
nationalism opposed by Thomas Jefferson. Id. at 1321. Andrew Jackson's nation-
alism was countered by John C. Calhoun's nullification doctrine. Also, the Civil
War was a basic states' rights conflict. Id.
25. See Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 761
(1982) (construing Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 107 (1860)). In the
Kentucky slavery case, the Court said that Congress "has no power to impose on a
State officer, as such, any duty whatever, and to compel him to perform it .... 65
U.S. (24 How.) at 107.
26. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
27. Id. at 274. The Court held that an act of Congress prohibiting child labor in
manufacturing was unconstitutional partly because the tenth amendment is a lim-
itation on the commerce power. Id. A grant of federal power "was not intended to
destroy the local power always existing and carefully reserved to the States in the
Tenth Amendment to the Constitution." Id.; see generally Powell, The Child Labor
Law, the Tenth Amendment, and the Commerce Clause, 3 Tui. L. REV. 175 (1918).
See also United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
28. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895). 'The fact that an article
is manufactured for export to another State does not of itself make it an article of
interstate commerce. . . ." Id. at 13. E.C. Knight Co. involved the regulation of
sugar refineries. Id. at 9. The Court in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238
(1936), held that coal mining was not commerce and, therefore, not subject to fed-
eral regulation. Id. at 303. Both of these cases relied on Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S.
1 (1888). The Court in Kidd held that manufacture of intoxicating beverages was
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affected interstate commerce could be regulated by the national
government. 29 Social motives behind congressional legislation at-
tempting to regulate commerce rendered the regulation invalid.30
With its decision in United States v. Darby, 31 the Court broad-
ened the commerce power.32 The Court in Darby held that the
commerce power was "complete in itself, may be exercised to its
utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than are
prescribed in the Constitution."33 The scope of national power to
regulate commerce expanded to include any activity if "it exerts a
substantial economic effect on interstate commerce .... -"34 The
promotion of social goals became a legitimate motive for an exer-
cise of power under the commerce clause.3 5
The tenth amendment was not considered one of the prescribed
limitations on the commerce power, but rather a mere declaration
of the relationship between the national and state governments. 36
In 1946, the Court used language which seemed to completely
eradicate the dual federalism, co-equal sovereign doctrine, when
not commerce for the purpose of allowing the state to regulate that activity. Id. at
25-26. If the Court described liquor manufacture as commerce, "Congress would
be invested, to the exclusion of the States, with the power to regulate . . . manu-
factures. . . ." And "the duty would devolve on Congress to regulate all of these
delicate, multiform, and vital interests. . . ." Id. at 21. The result in Kidd v. Pear-
son is regulation. Id. at 26. The result in E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. at 17-18, and
Carter Coal, 298 U.S at 316, is no regulation.
29. 156 U.S. at 16; 298 U.S. at 307.
30. Hammer, 247 U.S. at 273. The Court said that "[tihe Commerce Clause
was not intended to give to Congress a general authority to equalize such [child
labor] conditions." Id.
31. 312 U.S. 100 (1941). The Court expressly overruled its decision in Hammer.
Id. at 116-17.
32. Id. at 115. Darby involved the application of the Fair Labor Standards Act,
29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1938), to private enterprise. 312 U.S. at 108.
33. 312 U.S. at 114 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)).
34. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942). The Court abolished the old
direct/indirect test. Id. Even if not commerce, Congress may regulate an activity
"if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, and this irre-
spective of whether such effect is what might at some earlier time have been de-
fined as 'direct' or 'indirect.'" Id.
35. See Darby, 312 U.S. at 115, where the Court said: "The motive and purpose
of the present regulation are plainly to make effective the Congressional concep-
tion of public policy that interstate commerce should not be made the instrument
of competition in the distribution of goods produced under substandard [working]
conditions . . . ." See also Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,
261 (1964). Congressional use of the commerce power to legislate against racial
discrimination in public accomodations was held valid. Id.
36. 312 U.S. at 123-24. The Court in Darby declared:
The [tenth] amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has
not been surrendered. There is nothing in the history of its adoption to
it declared that there is no general "doctrine implied in the Fed-
eral Constitution that 'the two governments, national and state,
are each to exercise its powers so as not to interfere with the free
and full exercise of the powers of the other.' ",37 In effect, the tenth
amendment was without any substantial meaning, and dual feder-
alism was discredited.38
In 1972, the nation saw a foreshadowing of the rebirth of states'
rights and the revival of the tenth amendment. 39 The Court in Fry
v. United States40 declared that although the tenth amendment
has been "characterized as a 'truism,'. . . it is not without signifi-
cance. The amendment expressly declares the constitutional pol-
icy that Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that
impairs the States' integrity or their ability to function effectively
in a federal system."4 1 The Court balanced federal and state in-
suggest that it was more than declaratory of the relationship between the
national and state governments....
From the beginning and for many years the amendment has been con-
strued as not depriving the national government of authority to resort to
all means for the exercise of a granted power which are appropriate and
plainly adapted to the permitted end.
Id.
37. Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 101 (1946). The Supreme Court upheld an ap-
plication of price controls on the sale of timber by the state of Washington. Id. at
102. The Court rejected the state's argument that the extent to which Congress
can regulate the states depends on whether the regulated functions are "essen-
tial" to the state government. Id. at 101. Cf National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at
855. The Court was concerned that unchecked commerce power would "allow 'the
National Government [to] devour the essentials of state sovereignty.'" Id. (quot-
ing Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 205 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added), overruled in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)).
38. See M. REAGAN & J. SANZONE, THE NEW FEDERALISM 11 (2d ed. 1981). Pro-
fessor Reagan notes the demise of textual authority for separation between na-
tional and state governments. "Because the Tenth Amendment has no
independent power to foreclose expansions of federal activities under the neces-
sary and proper clause, there is no constitutionally binding permanent division of
authority between the national and state governments in the United States." Id.
See also Barber, National League of Cities v. Usery: New Meaning for the Tenth
Amendment?, 1976 Sup. CT. REV. 161, 162 (1976). Professor Barber claims that "the
Tenth Amendment came to have no restrictive significance. It was considered a
mere expression of sentiment whose time had passed with the growth of national
power .... " Id.
39. See Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975). The Economic Stabilization
Act of 1970, Act of Aug. 15, 1970, PuB. L. No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 79 (Act was amended
five times before expiration on April 30, 1974), gave the President authority to reg-
ulate wages. President Nixon established the Pay Board to regulate wages. 421
U.S. at 544. Petitioners, two employees of the state of Ohio, sought a writ of man-
damus to compel the state to give a pay increase as provided by state law. Id. The
law was inconsistent with the Pay Board's regulations. Id. Petitioners argued that
the Economic Stabilization Act as applied to state employees "interfere[d] with
sovereign state functions. . . ." Id. at 547. The Court recognized the significance
of state sovereignty, but rejected the employees' argument on the basis that the
regulation was not a "drastic invasion of state sovereignty." Id. at 548 n.7.
40. 421 U.S. at 542.
41. Id. at 547 n.7.
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terests to see if Congress' use of the commerce power was consti-
tutionally valid.42
Four years later a Supreme Court plurality of four members
used the tenth amendment to limit federal regulations of states in
National League of Cities. 43 The Court decided that Congress
could not use the commerce power to compel states to abide by
the Fair Labor Standards Act.44 A requirement that states follow
minimum wage regulations, the Court reasoned, would interfere
with states' rights to structure "functions essential to separate
and independent existence."45 In addition to relying on the tenth
amendment, Justice Rehnquist, author of the opinion, analogizes
from other state sovereignty based limitations on federal power,
such as state immunity from federal taxation 46 and state author-
42. Id. at 548. "Congress enacted the Economic Stabilization Act as an emer-
gency measure to counter severe inflation that threatened the national economy."
Id.
43. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). The Court, per Justice Rehnquist, declared that in Fry,
the "Court recognized that an express declaration of this limitation [on Congress'
power to regulate] is found in the Tenth Amendment." Id. at 842.
44. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1938) [hereinafter referred to as FLSA]. The FLSA re-
quires minimum wages to be paid to employees who are "engaged in commerce or
... [are] employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of
goods for commerce .... Id. at § 206(a).
45. 426 U.S. at 845 (quoting Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76
(1868)). The Court's argument in 1868 was essentially that the states predate the
Constitution and are essential to the nature of the government in the United
States. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 76. Unless expressly provided otherwise in the Consti-
tution, the states are supreme. Id. Furthermore, the Court said: "in many articles
of the Constitution the necessary existence of the States, and, within their proper
spheres, the independent authority of the States, is distinctly recognized. To them
nearly the whole charge of interior regulation is committed or left; to them and to
the people all powers not expressly delegated to the national government are re-
served." Id. Justice Rehnquist's use of Lane County showed his acceptance of
the nineteenth century doctrine of dual federalism. See supra note 25 and accom-
panying text.
46. 426 U.S. at 843. Justice Rehnquist cites New York v. United States, 326 U.S.
572 (1946). Justice Frankfurter stated the purpose of state immunity from federal
taxation as follows:
[T]he fear that one government may cripple or obstruct the operations of
the other early led to the assumption that there was reciprocal immunity
of the instrumentalities of each from taxation by the other. It was as-
sumed that there was an equivalence in the implications of taxation by a
State of the governmental activities of the National Government and the
taxation by the National Government of State instrumentalities. This as-
sumed equivalence was nourished by the phrase of Chief Justice Marshall
that the power to tax involves the power to destroy.
Id. at 576 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819)).
Three concurring justices also upheld state sovereignty in the taxation context by
affirming that a federal tax on a state "would be an unconstitutional exertion of
ity to locate its own seat of government.4 7 The Court expressly
overruled two prior decisions which rejected principles of state
sovereignty: Maryland v. Wirtz, 48 and United States v. Califor-
nia.49  The National League of Cities decision was highly
criticized.5 0
Five years later the Court paid respect to the National League
power over a coexisting sovereignty within the same framework of government."
326 U.S. at 586 (Reed, J., concurring). The dissent advocated stronger states' rights
positions based on the tenth amendment. Id. at 596 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
47. 426 U.S. at 845. Justice Rehnquist quotes Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559,
565 (1911), which states: "The power to locate its own seat of government and to
determine when and how it shall be changed from one place to another, and to
appropriate its own public funds for that purpose, are essentially and peculiarly
state powers. That one of the original thirteen States could now be shorn of such
powers by an act of Congress would not be for a moment entertained." Id.
48. 392 U.S. at 183 (overruled in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976)). Wirtz also involved the application of the FLSA's minimum wage require-
ments for state employees in hospitals and schools. 392 U.S. at 187. The Court
held: "If a State is engaging in economic activities that are validly regulated by the
Federal Government, . . . the State too may be forced to conform its activities to
federal regulation." Id. at 197.
49. 297 U.S. 175 (1936) (overruled in National League of Cities, 426 U.S. 833).
The Court held that a state operating a railroad is not immune from federal regu-
lations of railroads. 297 U.S. at 185. The Court in National League of Cities held
the following language to be wrong:
[We] look to the activities in which the states have traditionally engaged
as marking the boundary of the restriction upon the federal taxing power.
But there is no such limitation upon the plenary power to regulate com-
merce. The state can no more deny the power if its exercise has been au-
thorized by Congress than can an individual.
426 U.S. at 854 (quoting 297 U.S. at 185).
50. See Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutations of "Sover-
eignty" in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165 (1977). Professor
Michelman states that "the 'state sovereignty' invoked and canonized in the [Na-
tional League of Cities] opinion is a falsification of the considerations (that is, of
social justice and inchoate welfare rights) that alone might provide an ultimately
satisfying explanation for the result in that case-a falsification in the sense not
only of obscuring those considerations but also of twisting them .... Id. at 1192.
In explaining a functional approach to federal and state relations, Michelman ex-
presses the idea that federalism is based on the notion that states are best able to
provide certain services. Id. at 1173. Also, state officials are accountable to the
people for those (fire, police, and health) services. Id. at 1173-74. Archibald Cox
criticizes the decision by claiming it is "thoroughly inconsistent with the constitu-
tional trends and decisions of the past forty years .... [It is] likely that National
League of Cities will come to be seen as no more than an unprincipled exception
to the general rule of federal supremacy." Cox, Federalism and Individual Rights
under the Burger Court, 73 Nw. U.L. REV. 1, 22 (1978).
Professor Tushnet is concerned about the "arbitrary" quality of the National
League of Cities federalism. Tushnet, The Dilemmas of Liberal Constitutionalism,
42 OHIO ST. L.J. 411, 421 (1981). He criticizes the arbitrary doctrine of federalism
which:
allows the Court to state that constitutional limits on the exercise of judi-
cial or congressional or legislative power exist, but in a form that provides
no definition of those limits. Federalism is defended by patently arbitrary
rules that simultaneously assert the existence of limits and provide no
guarantees that in the next case the Court will defend federalism at all.
Id.
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of Cities concern for state sovereignty, but upheld the federal reg-
ulation in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Asso-
ciation.5 1 The Court extracted from National League of Cities a
three-pronged test to determine if an exercise of the commerce
power violates state sovereignty. 52 The first prong is the require-
ment that the challenged regulation must regulate the "States as
States." 53 The second prong requires that the "federal regulation
must address matters that are indisputably 'attribute Is] of state
sovereignty.' ,,54 The third prong mandates that the "States' com-
pliance with the federal law would directly impair their ability 'to
structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental
functions.' ,5 Although all three requirements may have been
51. 452 U.S. 264 (1981). The Court upheld the application of the Surface Min-
ing Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1976 & Supp. IlI
1979), against claims of exceeding the commerce power or "transgress [ing] affirm-
ative limitations on the exercise of that power contained in the ... Tenth
[Amendment]." 452 U.S. at 268. The Court discusses National League of Cities
and applies its reasoning, but distinguishes the facts of Hodel on the basis that the
regulation was of private businesses rather than of states. Id. at 286.
52. 452 U.S. at 287-88. The Court held that a claim that congressional com-
merce power legislation can be held invalid under the reasoning of National
League of Cities only if each of the three requirements are met. Id. at 287. See
infra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
53. 452 U.S. at 287 (quoting 426 U.S. at 854). The Court in Hodel found this re-
quirement lacking. 452 U.S. at 288. The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act of 1977, although establishing federal standards for surface mining, does not
preclude states from having their own regulations or require the state to enforce
federal regulations. Id. at 270-71.
Professor Michelman explains the "States as States" language to mean the
"'state' in the historically contingent sense of state-in-the-federal-system; not
State as a philosophical absolute like Family, Corporation, or Individual."
Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutations of "Sovereignty" in Na-
tional League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165, 1167 (1977). He further charac-
terizes the distinction between states and individuals as a "common-sense"
approach. Id.
54. 452 U.S. at 287-88 (quoting 426 U.S. at 845).
One undoubted attribute of state sovereignty is the States' power to deter-
mine the wages which shall be paid to those whom they employ in order
to carry out their governmental functions, what hours those persons will
work, and what compensation will be provided where these employees
may be called upon to work overtime.
426 U.S. at 845. Justice Brennan, in Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, re-
fused to include every employment decision into the category of attributes of state
sovereignty. 103 S. Ct. at 1061 n.11. National League of Cities also refers to other
attributes of state sovereignty such as location of a capitol and appropriation of
funds for a capitol building. 426 U.S. at 845. See supra note 47. Justice O'Connor,
in her dissent in Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742,
779 (1982), characterizes the power to make policy decisions and authority to enact
laws as attributes of state sovereignty.
55. 452 U.S. at 288 (quoting 426 U.S. at 852).
met, the Court has left a loophole to uphold the federal law if the
federal interest is great.5 6 Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion
in National League of Cities interprets the opinion as a balancing
approach between state and federal interests.5 7 Balancing may
be the Court's future method of solving intragovernmental
conflicts.5 8
III. THE PLURALITY OPINION
Justice Brennan, author of the vigorous dissent in National
League of Cities, 5 9 wrote the Court's opinion in Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission v. Wyoming. 60 The use of the wolf
to guard the sheep is evidence of the demise of National League
of Cities. Writing for a four member plurality, Justice Brennan
focused congressional intent to eradicate age discrimination. 61
56. "Demonstrating that these three requirements are met does not, however,
guarantee that a Tenth Amendment challenge to congressional commerce power
action will succeed. There are situations in which the nature of the federal inter-
est advanced may be such that it justifies state submission." Id. at 288 n.29.
57. 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun says the
Court's opinion "adopts a balancing approach, and does not outlaw federal power
in areas such as environmental protection, where the federal interest is demon-
strably greater and where state facility compliance with imposed federal stan-
dards would be essential." Id. The Court's opinion in National League of Cities is
unclear concerning balancing state and federal interests. Id. at 852-53. However,
the Court in Hodel clearly articulated Blackmun's balancing approach. 452 U.S. at
288 n.29.
58. See Johnson Controls, Inc. v. City of Cedar Rapids, 713 F.2d 370 (8th Cir.
1983). After the Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n decision was handed
down, this Court warned that "the majority opinion in National League of Cities
may have been overruled in toto by the Court's subsequent Tenth Amendment
cases, in favor of the balancing test articulated by Justice Blackmun in his pivotal
concurring opinion in National League of Cities." Id. at 378. Those subsequent
cases cited by the court are Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'7, 103 S. Ct. at
1062-64, Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 456 U.S. at 742, United Transportation
Union v. Long Island R.R. Co., 455 U.S. 678 (1982), and Hodel, 452 U.S. at 264.
59. 426 U.S. at 856 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan attacked the
states' rights protection of the Court as "an abstraction without substance,
founded neither on the words of the Constitution nor on precedent." Id. at 860.
He cites early twentieth century commerce power cases to support the supremacy
of the commerce power. Id. at 859-60. Justice Brennan claims the issue "'is not a
controversy between equals' when the Federal Government 'is asserting its sover-
eign power to regulate commerce .... [T) he interests of the nation are more im-
portant than of any state.'" Id. at 859 (quoting Sanitary Dist. v. United States, 266
U.S. 405, 425-26 (1925)). Furthermore, Justice Brennan interpreted National
League of Cities as an "abandonment of the heretofore unchallenged principle
that Congress 'can, if it chooses, entirely displace the States to the full extent of
the far-reaching Commerce Clause.'" 426 U.S. at 875 (quoting Bethlehem Steel
Co. v. New York State Bd., 330 U.S. 767, 780 (1947) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.)).
60. 103 S. Ct. at 1054. The short life of the state sovereignty based limit on the
commerce power is suggested by the Court's choice to have Justice Brennan write
this decision.
61. Id. at 1057-59. The ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1976) declares: "It is there-
fore the purpose of this [Act] to promote employment of older persons based on
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Representative Carl Perkins, Chairman of the House Committee
on Education and Labor, stated that the ADEA was more than an
attempt to bar age discrimination. "It is a [law] to promote em-
ployment of middle aged persons based on their ability."62 Critics
have complained that since the ADEA only protected people be-
tween ages 40 to 65 (now 70), the ADEA only promotes ability
rather than age distinctions for an unnecessarily limited number
of people. 63
Nevertheless, Justice Brennan argued that the prevalence of
age discrimination has two harmful effects: First, a significant
amount of productive labor is lost which results in substantially
increased costs in unemployment insurance and Social Security
benefits. Second, workers are inflicted with the economic and
psychological injury of not having the opportunity to work.64 How-
ever, the ADEA allows an employer to have a mandatory retire-
ment scheme based on age if the employer can show that age is a
bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ).65 The BFOQ was
designed to allow mandatory retirement in occupations such as
jet pilots. 66 Justice Brennan listed several lower court decisions
which have upheld the ADEA as a valid exercise of the commerce
power or of the fourteenth amendment.67 On the other hand, the
their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employ-
ment; to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from
the impact of age on employment."
62. See SENATE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING, 93RD CONG., 1ST SESS., IMPROV-
INC THE AGE DISCRIMINATION LAW, 37 (Comm. Print 1973) [hereinafter cited as SPE-
cIAL COMMrI-rEE I.
63. See Note, Age Discrimination in Employment: Correcting a Constitution-
ally Infirm Legislative Judgment, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, 1328 (1974). The limita-
tion of the ADEA to people ages 40-65 is a "contradiction to its express purpose":
prohibiting arbitrary age distinctions. Id.
64. 103 S. Ct. at 1058. See 29 U.S.C. 631 § 12(a) and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act Amendments of 1978, 92 Stat. 189 § 3 (raised the applicability of
the ADEA from persons aged 65 to 70).
65. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1) provides: "It shall not be unlawful for an employer
... to take any action otherwise prohibited . . . where age is a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification of the business .... Id. However, Chief Justice Burger ar-
gued in his dissent that a bona fide occupational qualification [hereinafter referred
to as BFOQ] is almost impossible to prove. 103 S. Ct. at 1071-72. See infra notes
100-01 and accompanying text.
66. See SPECIAL COMMITTEE, supra note 62, at 12. The occupation of jet pilot
was singled out as an area where quick reflexes are required, which may diminish
with age. Id.
67. 103 S. Ct. at 1059. He cites the following cases supporting the ADEA:
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. County of Calumet, 686 F.2d 1249,
1251-53 (7th Cir. 1982) (deputy county clerk retired at 65; ADEA valid under four-
state of Wyoming argued that the ADEA as applied to the states
violates the tenth amendment as construed by National League
of Cities. 68
To resolve the commerce power and tenth amendment conflict,
Justice Brennan limited the National League of Cities principle
of immunity to its purpose: assurance that the "unique benefits of
a federal system in which the states enjoy a 'separate and in-
dependent existence' be not lost through undue federal interfer-
ence in certain core state functions." 69 He then applied the three-
pronged test from National League of Cities and Hodel.70 The
first requirement that the federal regulation regulate "States as
teenth amendment); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Elrod, 674 F.2d
601, 603-12 (7th Cir. 1982) (county department of corrections employee retired at
63; ADEA valid under fourteenth amendment); Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267, 1269-
70 (4th Cir. 1977) (police officer retired at 40; ADEA valid under fourteenth amend-
ment); McCroan v. Bailey, 543 F. Supp. 1201, 1205-07 (S.D. Ga. 1982) (college book-
store cashier retired at 68; ADEA valid under the commerce clause); Kenny v.
Valley County School Dist., 543 F. Supp. 1194, 1196-99 (D. Mont. 1982) (teacher re-
tired at 65; ADEA valid under either fourteenth amendment or commerce clause);
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Minneapolis, 537 F. Supp. 750, 756 (D.
Minn. 1982) (police captain retired at 65; ADEA valid under either fourteenth
amendment or commerce clause); Bleakley v. Jekyll Island State Park Auth., 536
F. Supp. 236, 240 (S.D. Ga. 1982) (state employee retired at 65; ADEA valid but un-
decided as to source of power); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v.
County of Los Angeles, 531 F. Supp. 122, 124 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (requirement that ap-
plicants for helicopter pilot job be age 35 violates the ADEA); Equal Employment
Opportunity Comm'n v. County of Los Angeles, 526 F. Supp. 1135, 1137-38 (C.D.
Cal. 1981) (helicopter pilot applicants must be 35; ADEA is valid under the four-
teenth amendment); Adams v. James, 526 F. Supp. 80, 84 (M.D. Ala. 1981) (state
trooper captain retired at 60; ADEA valid under fourteenth amendment); Johnson
v. Mayor of Baltimore, 515 F. Supp. 1287, 1291-92 (D. Md. 1981) (fire department
employees retired at 55 and 60; ADEA is valid under the fourteenth amendment);
Carpenter v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd., 508 F. Supp. 148 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (Li-
quor Control Board officer mandatorily retired; ADEA valid under fourteenth
amendment); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Pennsylvania Liquor
Control Bd., 503 F. Supp. 1051, 1052-53 (M.D. Pa. 1980) (ADEA valid under four-
teenth amendment); Marshall v. Delaware River & Bay Auth., 471 F. Supp. 886, 891-
92 (D. Del. 1979) (retirement scheme of interstate agency invalid; ADEA valid
under fourteenth amendment); Remmick v. Barnes County, 435 F. Supp. 914 (D.
N.D. 1977) (ADEA valid under fourteenth amendment); Aaron v. Davis, 424 F.
Supp. 1238, 1239-41 (E.D. Ark. 1976) (fire chiefs retired at 62; ADEA valid under
commerce clause); Usery v. Board of Educ., 421 F. Supp. 718 (D. Utah 1976) (school
officials not promoted because of age; ADEA valid under fourteenth amendment
and commerce clause).
68. 103 S. Ct. at 1060. The state of Wyoming did not claim that Congress ex-
ceeded the scope of the commerce clause, but rather the application of the ADEA
to the states is precluded by "virtue of external constraints imposed on Congress'
commerce power by the Tenth Amendment." Id.
69. Id. (quoting Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1869) (cita-
tions omitted)). Justice Brennan distinguished this purpose from that of creating
a "sacred province of state autonomy." 103 S. Ct. at 1060.
70. 103 S. Ct. at 1061. See also supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
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States" was clearly met.7 1 The Court refused to decide whether
the second prong, "that the regulation address attributes of state
sovereignty," was met.72 The tenth amendment challenge failed
because the last requirement, that the ADEA directly impair Wy-
oming's "ability to structure integral operations in areas of tradi-
tional governmental functions," was lacking.7 3
Justice Brennan's explanation for the failure of the third prong
was that the federal intrusion in the present case was "less seri-
ous" than that in National League of Cities. 74 He agreed that the
maintenance of state parks is a state function. 75 However, he did
not discuss whether retirement policies were the result of struc-
turing integral operations. Instead, Justice Brennan focused on
the impairment portion of the test, making National League of
Cities the extreme; any federal law less intrusive would be up-
held. The application of the FLSA to the states was more serious
because a requirement that the states pay minimum wages would
financially cripple some states, depleting funds for other state
services.7 6 Also, the state would be precluded from social objec-
tives which favor the employment of people with subminimum
job qualifications.7 7 Since the ADEA does not affect the states ec-
71. 103 S. Ct. at 1061. Justice Brennan quoted the following from Hodel to
show the importance of the first prong:
A wealth of precedent attests to congressional authority to displace or
pre-empt state laws regulating private activity affecting interstate com-
merce when these laws conflict with federal law. . . . Although such con-
gressional enactments obviously curtail or prohibit the States'
prerogatives to make legislative choices respecting subjects the States
may consider important, the Supremacy Clause permits no other result.
Id. at n.10 (quoting 452 U.S. at 290 (emphasis added by Justice Brennan)).
72. 103 S. Ct. at 1061 (quoting 426 U.S. at 845). See also supra note 54 and ac-
companying text. A circuit court responding to this decision noted that in apply-
ing the three-pronged test, "the Supreme Court has avoided the first two parts of
the National League of Cities test and has proceeded directly to the third or 'key
prong' of that test." Johnson Controls, Inc. v. City of Cedar Rapids, 713 F.2d 370,
377 (8th Cir. 1983).
73. 103 S. Ct. at 1062. See also supra note 55 and accompanying text.
74. 103 S. Ct. at 1062. The comparison of intrusiveness indicates that the Court
may be using the balancing approach suggested by Justice Blackmun in National
League of Cities. See 426 U.S. at 856; supra notes 57, 58 and accompanying text.
75. Id. at 1062 (citing National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 851). See also infra
note 91.
76. 103 S. Ct. at 1062-63. Justice Rehnquist in National League of Cities was
concerned with states' choices to hire teenagers at less than minimum wages and
to employ workers without stringent overtime pay restrictions. 426 U.S. at 848-49.
The FLSA "penalizes the States for choosing to hire governmental employees on
terms different from those which Congress has sought to impose." Id. at 849.
77. 103 S. Ct. at 1063-64. Justice Brennan claims that Wyoming has "claimed
onomically to the degree the FLSA would, the third prong of the
test fails.78
The Court did not need to discuss the balancing approach be-
cause of the failure of the three-pronged test. 79 However, the
Court said that even if the third and second prong requirements
were met, the ADEA would still be valid because of the over-
whelming federal interest in the ending of age discrimination. 80
The apparent inconsistency of the federal government in applying
the ADEA to the states, but not to itself, did not destroy the
weight of the federal interest. 81 Justice Brennan did not decide
whether the ADEA could be upheld as an exercise of the four-
teenth amendment powers, but reaffirmed that the tenth amend-
ment places no limitations on congressional use of power under
the fourteenth amendment. 82 The Court concluded that the
ADEA, as an exercise of the commerce clause power, is not in vio-
lation of any tenth amendment principle.83
IV. BURGER'S DISsENT
Chief Justice Burger, along with Justices Powell, Rehnquist,
and O'Connor, dissented from the Court's conclusions. 84 The
Chief Justice applied the same National League of Cities three-
pronged test, but ended with a different result.85 In order for the
ADEA to violate the tenth amendment, the ADEA must regulate
no such [social] purpose" for this retirement law. Id. at 1064. However, he recog-
nized the state claimed a social policy of assuring "the physicial preparedness of
Wyoming game wardens to perform their duties." Id. at 1062 (quoting Brief for
Appellees at 18, 103 S. Ct. 1054).
78. Id. at 1062.
79. See supra note 52.
80. 103 S. Ct. at 1064 n.17.
81. Id. Acknowledging this inconsistency, Justice Brennan wrote:
We note, incidentally, that the strength of the federal interest underlying
the Act is not negated by the fact that the federal government happens to
impose mandatory retirement on a small class of its own workers....
Once Congress has asserted a federal interest, and once it has asserted
the strength of that interest, we have no warrant for reading into the ebbs
and flows of political decision making a conclusion that Congress was in-
sincere in that declaration. ...
Id.
82. Id. at 1064. Justice Brennan refused to acknowledge whether the ADEA
could be upheld under the fourteenth amendment. However, he reaffirmed his po-
sition that the tenth amendment places no limitations on an exercise of the power
under the fourteenth amendment. Id. at n.18.
83. Id. at 1064.
84. Id. at 1068 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). With the exception of Justice
O'Connor, who was not a member of the Court in 1976, the dissenters comprised
the plurality in National League of Cities. 426 U.S. at 833.
85. 103 S. Ct. at 1069. For an explanation of the three-pronged test, see supra
notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
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the "States as States." 86 There is no disagreement that it does.8 7
The Chief Justice examined the second prong of the test:
whether the ADEA addresses matters that are "attributes of state
sovereignty." 88 Chief Justice Burger argued that the decision of
Wyoming to retire its game wardens at age 55 is an attribute of
state sovereignty for four reasons.89 First, the Court in National
League of Cities expressly referred to the maintenance of parks
and recreation as a traditional state function.90 Such language is
analogous if not synonymous to game wardens' functions. Sec-
ond, "it is the essence of state power to choose-subject only to
constitutional limits-who is to be part of the state govern-
ment."91 Third, the state of Wyoming, rather than the United
States, is directly accountable to the people of Wyoming for the
preservation of fish and game.92 Finally, he offered persuasive ev-
86. Id. (quoting Hodel, 452 U.S. at 287-88, and National League of Cities, 426
U.S. at 854).
87. 103 S. Ct. at 1069. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
88. Id. at 1069. See supra note 69.
89. Id. at 1069 (quoting National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 854). Chief Jus-
tice Burger contends that "Wyoming sought to assure the physical preparedness
of its game wardens and others who enforce its laws. .... This goal is surely an
attribute of sovereignty .. " Id.
90. 103 S. Ct. at 1069. The Chief Justice relies on this language in National
League of Cities which says the FLSA would:
significantly alter or displace the States' abilities to structure employer-
employee relationships in such areas as fire prevention, police protection,
sanitation, public health, and parks and recreation. These activities are
typical of those performed by state and local governments in discharging
their dual functions of administering the public law and furnishing public
services. Indeed, it is functions such as these which governments are cre-
ated to provide, services such as these which the States have traditionally
afforded their citizens. If Congress may withdraw from the States the au-
thority to make those fundamental employment decisions upon which
their systems for performance of these functions must rest, we think there
would be little left of the States' "separate and independent existence."
Id. 426 U.S. at 851 (quoting Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911)) (emphasis
added). At the end of the Court's opinion in National League of Cities, Justice
Rehnquist again states that the "fire and police departments ... [provide] an in-
tegral portion of those governmental services which the States and their political
subdivisions have traditionally afforded their citizens." Id. at 855.
91. 103 S. Ct. at 1069 (emphasis in the original). Chief Justice Burger cites, for
comparison, Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 123 (1970). There the Court held that
the states could regulate national elections unless Congress interfered. Id. at 125.
However, the states have "the power to control state and local elections which the
Constitution originally reserved to them .. " Id. at 134-35.
92. 103 S. Ct. at 1069. The Chief Justice warns "[i]f poachers destroy the fish
and game reserves of Wyoming, it is not to the Congress that people are going to
complain, but to state and local authorities who will have to justify their actions in
selecting wardens. Since it is the state that bears the responsibility for delivering
idence that other states have similar retirement statutes. 93 Fur-
thermore, Congress has considered mandatory retirement an
exercise of its sovereignty by refusing to apply the ADEA to cer-
tain categories of federal employees. 94
Chief Justice Burger argued that the third prong-that the
ADEA must "impair the ability of the state to structure integral
operations" in areas of traditional functions-was met for several
reasons.95 Like the FLSA, the ADEA puts an undue financial bur-
the services, it is clearly an attribute of state sovereignty to choose who will per-
form these duties." Id.
Professor Michelman also suggests that an explanation of National League of
Cities is a "functional approach" of accountability. Michelman, supra note 53, at
1173. He suggests:
Congress and the federal executive do not normally think themselves pri-
marily or ultimately responsible for ensuring of [police and fire protection,
public health and sanitation, parks and recreation, and education] serv-
ices; and that the electorate does not normally hold them accountable for
failures to provide the services at acceptable levels of quality and cost
.... [TIhe political blame would [therefore] fall not on Congress but on
innocent and helpless state and local governments.
Id. at 1173-74.
93. 103 S. Ct. at 1069 & n.2. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 36-27-16(a)(1)(e) (Supp.
1983) (police, age 60); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-455(c) (1977) (police, 65); CAL. GOV'T
CODE ANN. § 20980(West 1980) (highway patrol, 60); DEI. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 8323
(1979) (police, 55); IDAHO CODE § 50-1514(a) (Supp. 1983) (police, 65); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 24, 10-2.1-17 (Supp. 1983-84) (police and firemen, 65); IND. CODE § 36-8-3.5-
20 (1981) (police and firemen; 65); IOWA CODE § 97B.46(3) (Supp. 1983-84) (peace
officers and firefighters, 65); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-4975(b) (1980) (patrolmen, 60);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42:691 (West Supp. 1984) (law enforcement personnel and
firefighters, 65); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 32, § 69(d) (West 1966) (police, 65);
MICH. Comp. LAws § 5.3375(b) (1982) (police and firemen, 65); MINN. STAT ANN.
§ 423.075(1) (West Supp. 1984) (police and firemen, 65); Miss. CODE ANN. § 25-1311
(Supp. 1983) (highway patrol, 55), 21-29-245 (Supp. 1983) (police and firemen, 60);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 104.010 & § 104.080 (West Supp. 1984) (highway patrol, 60); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 19-6-504 (1983) (highway patrol, 60), 19-9-801(3) (1983) (police, 65);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-2025(2) (1981) (patrolmen, 60); N.Y. RETIRE. & SOC. SEC. LAW
§ 381-b(e) (McKinney Supp. 1983-84) (police and firemen, 55); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 39-03.1-18 (1980) (highway patrol, 60); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5505.16 (Page Supp.
1981) (highway patrol, 55); OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 2-305A (Supp. 1983-84) (police, 60);
ORE. REV. STAT. § 237.129(1) (1983) (school personnel, 70): PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71,
§ 65(d) (Purdon Supp. 1983-84) (police, 60); R.I. GEN. LAws § 45-21.2-5 (Supp. 1980)
(police and firemen, 65); S.C. CODE ANN. § 9-1-1535 (Law Co-op Supp. 1982) (con-
servation officers, 65); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-36-205(1) (1980) (police, 60); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 3, § 459(a)(2) (Supp. 1983) (police, 55); WASH. REV. CODE § 43.43.250(1)
(1983) (state patrol, 60); W. VA. CODE § 8-22-25(d) (Supp. 1983) (policemen and
firemen, 65); Wyo. STAT. § 15-5-307(a) (Supp. 1982) (police, 60). In addition, there
are also 160 municipalities that have similar laws. 103 S. Ct. at 1070 n.2.
94. 103 S. Ct. at 1070. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 948, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted
in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3698. 'This bill requires mandatory retire-
ment of otherwise eligible law-enforcement officers and firefighters at age 55....
This intent [to retire employees early] has been based on the nature of the work
involved and the determination that these occupations should be composed ... of
young men and women .... They are the occupations calling for the strength and
stamina of the young rather than the middle aged." Id. at 3699.
95. 103 S. Ct. at 1071. See 10 U.S.C. § 1251 (1982) (mandatory retirement in the
[Vol. 11: 707, 1984] EEOC v. Wyoming
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
den on the states. 96 A ban on early retirement schemes also "im-
pedes promotion opportunities" and "affirmative action
objectives." 97 These noneconomic goals are surely valid because
the federal government uses them to justify its early retirement
laws.98 Finally, the ability of Wyoming to keep its mandatory re-
tirement system upon proving a BFOQ is no help at all. 99 A com-
mon approach to proving a BFOQ requires proof that: (1) the age
qualification is reasonably necessary to the business; and (2) the
employer has reason to believe all or substantially all persons
above the age limit are unfit for the job.100 The Chief Justice
claims the second part of the test is impossible to prove.101
After showing that the requirements of the three-pronged test
were met, Chief Justice Burger balanced the state and federal in-
terests to see if the ADEA is unconstitutional. 10 2 The balancing
requirement was extrapolated by the court in Hodel. 103 Chief Jus-
tice Burger characterized the federal interest as "largely theoreti-
Armed Services); 22 U.S.C. § 4052 (1982) (mandatory retirement for Foreign Serv-
ice personnel).
96. 103 S. Ct. at 1070. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
97. Id. at 1071.
98. Id. He contends that the "[1l]ack of such opportunities tends to undermine
younger employees' incentive to strive for excellence ... Id.
99. Id. See infra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
100. Id. at 1071-72. Chief Justice Burger gets this test from Arritt v. Grisell, 567
F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1977) (Virginia law precluding 40 year old police officer from ap-
plying for civil service job violated the ADEA). The court in Arritt derived this
strict standard for proving a BFOQ from Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, 531 F.2d
224 (5th Cir. 1976) (bus company's refusal to accept applications from individuals
between ages 40 and 65 held valid). 567 F.2d at 1271.
101. 103 S. Ct. at 1072. Chief Justice Burger cites Johnson v. Mayor of Balti-
more, 515 F. Supp. 1287 (D. Md. 1981), cert.denied, 455 U.S. 944 (1982). Baltimore
was unable to show that age 55 was a BFOQ for firefighters. Id. at 1294.
Notice the instability of decisions in this area: Keating v. Federal Aviation Ad-
min., 610 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1980) (BFOQ proven for pilots, age 60). Cf. Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Comm'n v. County of Los Angeles, 706 F.2d 1039 (9th Cir.
1983) (no BFOQ for helicopter pilots); cf. Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dept.,
697 F.2d 743 (7th Cir. 1983) (no BFOQ for firefighters, age 55); Tuohy v. Ford Motor
Co., 675 F.2d 842 (6th Cir. 1982) (no BFOQ for pilots, age 60, as a matter of law);
(See supra note 66 and accompanying text); Equal Employment Opportunity
Comm'n v. Janesville, 630 F.2d 1254 (7th Cir. 1980) (BFOQ for police chief found).
The Court in Orzel said the BFOQ exception is to be interpreted narrowly. 697
F.2d at 748. See also Stillman & Jepson, Compliance with the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act: Special Problems, 64 CHI. B. REC. 284, 288 (1983).
102. 103 S. Ct. at 1072.
103. 452 U.S. at 288 n.29. In National League of Cities, the Court justified the
application of the federal wage controls to state employees in Fry because the fed-
eral interest was to "counter severe inflation that threatened the national econ-
omy." 426 U.S. at 853 (quoting 421 U.S. at 548).
cal."104 On the other side of the scale, the state has a great
interest in assuring the physical preparedness of firefighters and
law enforcement personnel.O5 He rejected the charge that Wyo-
ming's interest is merely a "bald assertion of a prerogative to be
arbitrary."106
Chief Justice Burger further addressed the issue as to whether
the ADEA is valid as an exercise of the fourteenth amendment. 07
He contended that although congressional power under the four-
teenth amendment is unclear, one principle is certain: "Congress
may act only where a violation lurks." 08 Neither the Court nor
Congress has found employment discrimination based on age to
be a violation of fourteenth amendment rights.109 The Court in
City of Rome v. United States"O recognized congressional power
to prohibit activity not in itself unconstitutional, but which, when
prohibited, prevents the encroachment of guaranteed rights.il'
However, Chief Justice Burger argued that the right to work re-
gardless of age has not been identified by the Court as a four-
teenth amendment right.112 Therefore, the ADEA is not a valid
exercise of congressional power under the fourteenth
104. 103 S. Ct. at 1072. Chief Justice Burger rejected the weight of the Commis-
sion's claim that the ADEA "prevent[s] unnecessary demands on the social secur-
ity system and other maintenance programs, . . . [protects] employees from
arbitrary discrimination, and [eliminates] unnecessary burdens of the free flow of
commerce. . . ." Id. Not only may the benefits be theoretical, it is hard to ignore
the federal inconsistency in having its own mandatory retirement schemes. See
supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
105. Id. at 1072. Chief Justice Burger compared the "theoretical benefits" with
the "very real danger" of a fire out of control or a criminal escaping and injuring
an officer. Id.
106. 103 S. Ct. at 1072 (quoting Brief for Appellant at 19). Furthermore, the
Chief Justice argued that "Wyoming is [not] resting its challenge to the [ADEA]
on a 'sovereign' right to discriminate" but rather "asserting a right to set standards
to meet local needs." Id.
107. 103 S. Ct. at 1072-74.
108. Id. at 1072-73. Chief Justice Burger cited no case law to indicate his
certainty.
109. Id. at 1073. Twice the Court has upheld mandatory retirement schemes
against equal protection challenges. See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979)
(mandatory retirement for Foreign Service officers valid); Massachusetts Bd. of
Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (mandatory retirement of state police
valid). As far as Congress is concerned, Chief Justice Burger contended that
"[tihe ability of Congress to define independently protected classes is an issue
that need not be resolved here because I think that the Age Act is unconstitu-
tional even if it is assumed that Congress has this power." 103 S. Ct. at 1073 n.6.
He contended that the "[ADEA] can be sustained only if we assume first, that
Congress can define rights wholly independent of our case law, and second, that
Congress has done so here. I agree with neither proposition." Id. at 1074.
110. 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
111. Id. at 176-77. Changes in a city's electoral system may endanger the rights
of black voters. Id.
112. 103 S. Ct. at 1073 n.7. Chief Justice Burger declared "that since this Court
has not decided the question, the Government cannot support this enactment on
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amendment.113
V. CONCURRENCE AND DISSENT
The instability of the adherence or rejection of principles of fed-
eralism is evident from the lack of agreement among the Court
members. In addition to the Court's opinion and Chief Justice
Burger's dissent, Justice Stevens wrote a separate concurring
opinion"l4 and Justice Powell, a separate dissent."l 5 Justice Ste-
vens gave broad power to Congress under the commerce
clause."16 Justice Powell, although having joined Chief Justice
Burger's dissent, wrote specifically to counter Justice Stevens'
claims."17
Justice Stevens in his concurring opinion defended national
supremacy with words of historical rhetoric."l 8 He maintained
that the need for regulation of commerce was the "central prob-
lem that gave rise to the Constitution itself.""19 Furthermore, the
Court has historically expanded the commerce power to "reflect
the intent of the Framers of the Constitution [and] to confer a
power on the national government adequate to discharge its cen-
the ground that Congress was attempting to establish further safeguards for a
class we have found to be constitutionally protected." Id.
113. Id. at 1073.
114. Id. at 1064 (Stevens, J., concurring).
115. 103 S. Ct. at 1075 (Powell, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 1068. Justice Stevens declared that "Jilf the power is to be adequate
to enable the national government to perform its central mission [to regulate com-
merce]," Congress must be free to regulate states. Id.
117. Id. at 1075. Justice Powell did not use his dissent to attack the Court's
opinion, but rather Justice Stevens' separate concurrence.
118. 103 S. Ct. at 1065. Justice Stevens' emphasis was on Congress' power to
regulate commerce as the historical catalyst for establishing the Constitution and
rejecting the Articles of Confederation. Id.
119. Id. In support of this proposition, Justice Stevens relied upon a 1946 lec-
ture by Justice Rutledge. Justice Stevens quotes the following language from that
lecture:
If any liberties may be held more basic than others, they are the great
and indispensable democratic freedoms secured by the First Amendment.
But it was not to assure them that the Constitution was framed and
adopted. Only later were they added, by popular demand. It was rather to
secure freedom of trade, to break down the barriers to its free flow, that
the Annapolis Convention was called, only to adjourn with a view to Phila-
delphia. Thus the generating source of the Constitution lay in the rising
volume of restraints upon commerce which the Confederation could not
check. These were the proximate cause of our national existence down to
today.
Id. (quoting W. RUTLEDGE, A DECLARATION OF LEGAL FAITH 25 (1947)).
tral mission."120 Only specific limitations in the Constitution limit
that power.121 However, no limitations applied in this case.' 22
Justice Stevens' disagreement with the principles of federalism
expressed in National League of Cities was apparent again.' 23 He
characterized the National League of Cities opinion as "pure judi-
cial fiat" and unworthy of "the deference that the doctrine of stare
decisis ordinarily commands for this Court's precedents."'124 He
called for a "prompt rejection of National League of Cities mod-
ern embodiment of the spirit of the Articles of Confederation." 25
Justice O'Connor joined Justice Powell's rejection of Justice
Stevens' "novel view of our Nation's history."126 The dissenters
took a more moderate approach, claiming that the regulation of
commerce is only one raison d'etre of the United States among
many others. 127 Preservation of federalism was as important, if
not more important, than the need for regulation of interstate
commerce. 28 In support of states' rights, Justice Powell used the
initial ratification of the Constitution on a state-by-state basis.129
Opponents of the Bill of Rights did not oppose limitations on the
national government, but rather contended that such limitations
120. 103 S. Ct. at 1066. The expansion accompanied the change from a local to a
regional to a national economy. Id.
121. Id. at 1067. Justice Stevens agreed that "Congress may not, of course, tran-
scend specific limitations on its exercise of the commerce power that are imposed
by other provisions of the Constitution." Id. By requiring specific limitations, he
rejected any implied or inherent federalism based protections of state sovereignty.
122. Id. He maintained, "no limitation in the text of the Constitution . . . is
even arguably applicable to this case." Id. Justice Stevens reiterated the position
of the Court in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941), that the tenth
"amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surren-
dered .... From the beginning and for many years the amendment has been con-
strued as not depriving the national government of authority to resort to all means
for the exercise of a granted Power .. " Id.
123. 103 S. Ct. at 1067. See National League of Cities, 426 U.S. 833, 880 (1976)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
124. 103 S. Ct. at 1067.
125. Id. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
126. Id. at 1075 (Powell, J., dissenting).
127. 103 S. Ct. at 1076. Justice Powell agreed that "removing trade barriers be-
tween the States was one of the Constitution's purposes." Id. However, "creating
a national government within a federal system was far more central than any 18th
century concern for interstate commerce." Justice Powell did not defend the sig-
nificance of the Founders' intent. However, since Justice Stevens relied on the
Founders' intent to exalt the commerce power, Justice Powell argued that their in-
tent did not revolve around the need to regulate commerce. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1078. Further support lies in James Madison's explanation that
"[t]he State Governments may be regarded as constituent and essential parts of
the federal Government; whilst the latter is nowise essential to the operation or
organization of the former." THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 311 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke
ed. 1961).
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as amendments were unnecessary.130
Justice Powell further relied on early historical assertions of
states' rights as evidence of an early assumption of state sover-
eignty based federalism.131 He maintained that the Framers' in-
tent is of little significance today, thus rejecting Justice Stevens'
reliance on the Framers' intent to exalt commerce above all other
provisions. Justice Powell found his own historical rhetoric to
counter Justice Stevens' assertions.132
To dispel any notion that all respect for states' rights was abol-
ished during the Civil War, Justice Powell mentioned several re-
cent Supreme Court decisions which considered state
sovereignty.133 Justices Powell and O'Connor are concerned that
Justice Stevens has emasculated state sovereignty134 since decen-
tralization of power is a safeguard which protects individual liber-
ties. 1 35 The separation of power doctrine applies not only within
130. 103 S. Ct. at 1078. See THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 579 (A. Hamilton) (J.
Cooke ed. 1961). Hamilton contends that "the constitution ought not to be charged
with the absurdity of providing against the abuse of an authority which was not
given .. " Id. His example was freedom of the press. Since Congress could not
imaginably control or regulate the press under any granted power, why must there
be an amendment to guarantee such a freedom? Id.
131. 103 S. Ct. at 1078-79. Justice Powell referred to Thomas Jefferson's Ken-
tucky Resolutions which emphasized the reserved powers of the states. Kentucky
Resolution of 1798, reprinted in 4 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTrru-
TION 536-40 (2d ed. 1863). Justice Powell mentioned similar ideas found in the Vir-
ginia Resolutions and John C. Calhoun's nullification doctrine. Id. at 1078 n.8.
Justice Powell asserted that the presence of these state sovereignty doctrines
tends to deny that there was ever "any intention that the Commerce Clause would
empower the Federal Government to intrude expansively upon the sovereign pow-
ers reserved to the States." Id.
132. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
133. 103 S. Ct. at 1080 n.12. See Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Missis-
sippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982) (state sovereignty was a consideration in determining if
states must follow public utility regulations); United Trans. Union v. Long Island
R.R. Co., 455 U.S. 678 (1982) (federal government may regulate state owned rail-
road only because operation of a railroad is not a sovereign function of the state);
Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982) (State is ex-
empt from antitrust laws).
134. 103 S. Ct. at 1081. Justice Powell warned that under Justice Stevens' view,
"it is not easy to think of any state function-however sovereign-that could not
be preempted." Id.
The reader should be aware that some commentators consider the conflict to be
merely one of efficiency. States are sovereign only because, and to the degree
that, they can serve the people more efficiently than the federal government. See
Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles, 86 YALE L.J. 1165, 1172-73 (1977).
135. See Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental Value: National League of Cities
in Perspective, 1981 SuP. CT. REV. 81 (1981). Nagel quotes THE FEDERALIST No. 46,
at 299 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961), which declares it is "the existence of
the branches of the federal government, but also between the fed-
eral and state governments.136
VI. AFTERMATH
After the smoke has cleared, there is still little certainty as to
the scope of Congress' power to regulate the states. The forces
remain assembled. Justice Rehnquist stands firmly committed to
the states' rights position. 137 With the exception of his position in
Fry, 138 Chief Justice Burger has agreed with Justice Rehnquist's
view of federalism.139 Justice Powell also has followed the state
sovereignty path.140 Finally, Justice O'Connor, the newest mem-
ber of the Court, may be one of the strongest supporters of states'
rights.'41
In the other camp, Justice Stevens has taken a strong national
supremacy stand with little room to retreat.142 Although not as
extreme as Justice Stevens, Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
White have traditionally been allied together in support of na-
subordinate governments to which the people are attached [that] forms a barrier
against the enterprises of ambition." Id. at 100.
136. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 790 (1981)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). She contends that the Founding Fathers, in order to
avoid the evil of a powerful central government, "both allocated governmental
power between state and national authorities, and divided the national power
among three branches of government." Id. See also Wechsler, The Political Safe-
guards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition of the National
Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 543-44 (1954).
137. For a full treatment of Justice Rehnquist's position on federalism, see
Powell, The Compleat Jeffersonian: Justice Rehnquist and Federalism, 91 YALE L.J.
1317 (1982). Justice Rehnquist has stood on the states' rights' side in Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. at 1068 (joining Chief Justice Burger's
dissent), Federal Energy Regulatory Commn, 456 U.S. at 775 (joining Justice
O'Connor's partial concurrence and partial dissent), Hodel, 452 U.S. at 307 (con-
curring in judgment), National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 835 (author of the
Court's opinion), and Fry, 421 U.S. at 549 (dissenting).
138. 421 U.S. at 542. Chief Justice Burger joined the majority opinion.
139. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. at 1068 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting); Federal Regulatory Comm'n, 456 U.S. at 775 (joining Justice
O'Connor's partial concurrence and partial dissent); Hodel, 452 U.S. at 305 (Bur-
ger, C.J., concurring); National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 834.
140. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. at 1068, 1075 (join-
ing Chief Justice Burger's dissent and writing his own separate dissent); Federal
Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 456 U.S. at 771 (concurring and dissenting in part);
National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 834 (joining the Court's opinion).
141. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. at 1068, 1075 (join-
ing Chief Justice Burger's dissent and Justice Powell's dissent); Federal Energy
Regulatory Comm'n, 456 U.S. at 775 (O'Connor, J., partially concurring and
dissenting).
142. 103 S. Ct. at 1064 (Stevens, J., concurring). See supra notes 119-126 and ac-
companying text. See also Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 456 U.S. at 745
(joining the Court's opinion); Hodel, 452 U.S. at 268 (joining the Court's opinion);
National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 880 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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tional power.143 Justice Blackmun, however, has upheld federal
power except in the most important case: National League of Cit-
ies. 14 4 Since he cast the swing vote in National League of Cities,
Justice Blackmun may be the swing vote in the future. Since the
federalism cases have been critically divided, a new member of
the Court could either bring National League of Cities back to life
or bury it altogether.145
The impact of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
decision reaches further than Wyoming's Game Wardens. Protec-
tive service personnel, such as police department and fire depart-
ment employees, are also affected. Thirty-two states have similar
retirement statutes for protective service personnel. 46 All of
these statutes violate the ADEA unless the state can show that
age is a BFOQ. 147 Furthermore, unless Congress or the courts
lessen the burden of proving a BFOQ, it is unlikely that states
will be able to meet the burden of proof. 48
This decision also lessens the importance of National League of
Cities, almost limiting it to its facts. 14 9 The states' rights issue
can and will arise in many other situations. One obvious area in
which federal and state law may conflict is administrative law. 50
143. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. at 1056 (Justices
White and Marshall joined Justice Brennan's opinion); Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, 456 U.S. at 745 (Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall joined Justice
Blackmun's opinion); Hodel, 452 U.S. at 268 (Justices Brennan and White joined
Justice Marshall's opinion); National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 856 (Justices
White and Marshall joined Justice Brennan's dissent); Fry, 421 U.S. at 543 (Jus-
tices Brennan and White joined Justice Marshall's opinion).
144. 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Compare Fry, 421 U.S. at 543
(joined the Court's opinion), with Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 103 S.
Ct. at 1056 (joined the Court's opinion); Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n , 456
U.S. at 745 (author of the Court's opinion); Hodel, 452 U.S. at 268 (joined the
Court's opinion); National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
145. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. at 1054 (five to four
decision; four separate opinions); Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 456 U.S. 742
(five to four decision; three separate opinions); National League of Cities, 426 U.S.
at 833 (five to four decision; four separate opinions); Fry, 421 U.S. at 543 (Justices
Brennan and White joined Justice Marshall's opinion).
146. See supra note 93.
147. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
149. See Johnson Controls, Inc., 713 F.2d 340, 378 (8th Cir. 1983). If not over-
ruled, "[alt the very least the National League of Cities holding has been nar-
rowly confined to its precise facts." Id.
150. See Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 456 U.S. at 742 (federal public
utility regulations must be considered by the states); United States v. Ohio Dept.
of Highway Safety, 635 F.2d 1195 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 949 (1981)
Another area is the power of the federal courts.1 51 Any exercise
of federal power may impinge upon state functions and thereby
raise the tenth amendment issue. The National League of Cities
doctrine, however, has almost exclusively been limited to com-
merce power cases. 152 The Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission decision has left little of the states' rights protection of
National League of Cities. In resolving future conflicts, courts
will probably use Justice Blackmun's balancing test or overrule or
ignore National League of Cities altogether.153 However, the con-
cern should remain that power be not overly centralized and the
states be not mere federal provinces.
RICHARD M. STEPHENS
(Environmental Protection Agency requirement that states withhold registrations
for vehicles which did not pass inspections was valid).
151. See United States v. District of Columbia, 654 F.2d 802 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981) (federal district court enjoined compliance with a
state court order); United States v. Best, 573 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1978) (motorist
drove under the influence of alcohol on federal enclave; state driver's license could
not be suspended by United States Magistrate).
152. See Phillips, The Declining Fortunes of National League of Cities v. Usery,
21 AM. Bus. L.J. 89 (1983). Phillips discusses the enforcement clauses of the thir-
teenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments and the spending, war, and postal
powers. Id. at 96-100. He concludes that the "National League of Cities doctrine
has little, if any, application to exercise of congressional power justified by powers
other than the commerce clause." Id. at 113.
153. See Johnson Controls, Inc., 713 F.2d at 378. "Indeed, the majority opinion in
National League of Cities may have been overruled in toto by the Court's subse-
quent tenth amendment cases, in favor of the balancing test articulated by Justice
Blackmun in his pivotal concurring opinion in National League of Cities, . . ." Id.
